Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
International Research Workshop on IT Project
Management 2008

International Research Workshop on IT Project
Management (IRWITPM)

2008

Towards Information Systems Project Success: The
Influence of Incentives on Project Managers' Drive
and Participation
Corina Raduescu
University of Queensland, c.raduescu@business.uq.edu.au

Jon Heales, Ph.D.
University of Queensland, j.heales@business.uq.edu.au

Keith Frampton, Ph.D.
The Marlo Group, keith_frampton@bigpond.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/irwitpm2008
Recommended Citation
Raduescu, Corina; Heales, Ph.D., Jon; and Frampton, Ph.D., Keith, "Towards Information Systems Project Success: The Influence of
Incentives on Project Managers' Drive and Participation" (2008). International Research Workshop on IT Project Management 2008. 12.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/irwitpm2008/12

This material is brought to you by the International Research Workshop on IT Project Management (IRWITPM) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It
has been accepted for inclusion in International Research Workshop on IT Project Management 2008 by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic
Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Raduescu et al.
Participation

The Influence of Incentives on Project Managers’ Drive and

Towards Information Systems Project Success: The
Influence of Incentives on Project Managers’ Drive
and Participation
Corina Raduescu, MInfmSystems
Business School
The University of Queensland
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia
Phone: +61 7 3365 6289; Fax: +61 7 3365
6788
Email: c.raduescu@business.uq.edu.au

Jon Heales, PhD
Business School
The University of Queensland
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia
Phone: +61 7 3365 6433; Fax: +61 7 3365
6788
Email: j.heales@business.uq.edu.au

Keith Frampton, PhD
The Marlo Group
Southbank, Victoria 3006
Australia
Phone: +61 3 9937 2750; Fax: +61 3 9937 2799
Email: Keith_Frampton@bigpond.com
ABSTRACT

Project managers’ behavior has been found to positively influence project outcomes we explore the issue through
the development of a two-stage model incorporating agency theory that examines the relationship between PM
behavior and IS project success. We measure project success by delivery on time, within budget, and adhering to
specification. A web-based survey was used to collect data and test the model using SEM. The two-stage model was
supported, however, further analysis suggests that a combination of three factors commitment, willingness, and
motivation would significantly improve the model fit by forming a higher-order factor we call drive. We found that
PM’s participation level is the most important factor influencing project success and is directly influenced by
incentives and drive.
Keywords

Incentives, Project Management, Information Systems, Agency Theory, Success, Performance, Motivation,
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INTRODUCTION

Critical to the future success of business activities and initiatives are information systems (IS) designed to meet the
challenges of today’s and tomorrow’s business environment (Ba et al., 2001). As a result organizations continue to
make large investments in and devote substantial resources to IS that are intended to deliver significant performance
gains (Yetton et al., 2000). The major organizational benefits from successful IS projects will be reflected in: 1)
reduction of costs associated with IS projects, 2) improvement of organizations’ return on investment (ROI), 3)
timely implementation of planned functionality, and 4) delivery of functionality designed to meet the needs.
IS project problems such as failures and overruns continue to exist and have changed little over the past three
decades (IT Cortex, 2003; KPMG, 2003). To address these issues we draw our attention to project managers. Jiang
et al. (2001) found the project manager role was critical for IS project success. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests linking
performance to incentives as a way to improve project managers’ performance.
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We therefore explore the relationship between IS project managers and IS project outcomes by examining how the
use of incentives in the project manager arena can improve the IS project success. We incorporate the work of
Martisons and Chong (1999), and Yetton et al. (2000) and seek to answer the following research questions:
(1) What aspects of project managers’ behavior are influenced by the use of incentives?
(2) What influence does that behavior have on the criteria for successful IS project outcomes?
We address our research questions by employing agency theory (AT) to examine incentives’ influence on project
managers’ (PM) behavior. We develop a research model that relates the use of incentives to PM behavior and the
impact of their behavior on IS project outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present the background of the study. Second, we
develop the research model and propositions. Third, we present the research methodology employed. Fourth, we
present the data analysis..Fifth, we discuss the research findings. Sixth, we present the contributions and limitations
of this study, and highlight further research.
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

To address our research questions and develop an agency-based research model, we; 1) identify the factors leading
to and criteria for IS project success; 2) understand the role of project managers in IS projects; and 3) understand the
role of AT in improving current practices in IS projects.
Criteria for IS Project Success

Technical factors and the role of user’s involvement in IS projects have been established among the most important
factors influencing the IS development (Barki and Hartwick, 1994b). Further, problems in IS projects are linked to
social, conceptual, or organizational factors such as, motivation, commitment, involvement, communication, and
good project management (Guthrie and Hollensbe, 2004; Kim and Peterson, 2000; Shoniregun, 2004; Walsh and
Schneider, 2002).
From existing literature, we found that time, cost, and adherence to specifications are the most cited performance
criteria relevant to IS project success (KMPG 2003). Consistent with Banker and Kemerer’s (1992) model for IS
performance , we consider a “successful” IS project, a project delivered on time, within budget, and adhering to
specifications.
Project Manager Role in IS Projects

Sound project management is essential to ensure greater probability of IS project success (Shoniregun, 2004). Jiang
et al. (2001) highlight the important role of PM in IS projects and suggest that PM’s performance has a direct
relationship with the project outcomes. Shoniregun (2004) suggests PMs should rely more on their personal skills
involvement rather than on automated project management tools. Therefore, we suggest that ways to improve the
PM’s contribution to project outcomes is through their personal skills and behavior.
Agency Theory

In recent years AT has emerged as a main theory guiding research on the pay-performance relationship (Eisenhardt,
1989). AT explains how to best organize a relationship in which one party (the principal) directs the work of another
party (the agent).
AT argues that problems arise in an agency relationship when: 1) the desires or goals of the principal and agent are
in conflict and 2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. AT addresses
these problems via contracts that provide incentives to agents with the purpose of motivating them to exert effort in
directions that are aligned with the interests of the principals (McKenzie and Lee, 1998).
Agency Theory in IS Projects
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In IS projects, Banker and Kemerer (1992) advocate that agency relationship consists of: 1) the owner of the project
(the principal) who is concerned with the successful delivery of the IS project, and 2) the PM (the agent) who is
responsible for the management of IS project. Mahaney and Lederer (2003) suggest that by introducing incentive
contracts, PMs will give more attention and effort to controlling and monitoring the IS projects, hence they can
contribute to a lower failure rate of IS projects. Provided that incentives are aligned positively with successful
project outcomes it is likely the provision of incentives will result in a greater likelihood of project success (Sharma
and Yetton, 2003).
RESEARCH MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS

We examined the behavioral literature and choose four factors of PM’s behavior for inclusion in our research model
(see Figure 1): commitment, willingness to act, motivation toward, and participation in IS project tasks.
We believe that AT explains how incentives are most likely to influence the PM’s behavior, which in turn is likely
to impact the IS project outcomes. Although, AT and use of incentives were addressed in the arena of employees in
general, we extrapolate their use to PMs because we view PMs as a type of employee.

Figure 1. Agency-Based Research Model
Commitment and Willingness to Act

Butler and Fitzgerald (2001) propose that management commitment and willingness to act on project activities are
among the key factors that impact on project success. Because these two factors are likely to influence work related
performance, we include commitment and willingness to act as factors that might have a positive effect on project
outcomes.
Commitment

Commitment can be defined as the sense of loyalty to an organization or a project (Jurison, 1999). Committed
employees are willing to devote more of their time and energy to the project; hence a greater desire to contribute to
the project success. Organizations seek to create committed employees by implementing incentive contracts
(Moorman et al., 1998). Employees who benefit financially, will be more committed to the organization or project
they work on (Klein et al., 2001). Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 1a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of PM’s commitment toward an IS
project.
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Commitment to an IS project is an important factor in its successful completion (Mahaney and Lederer, 1999).
Further, committed employees have a greater desire: 1) to perform better on their job, and 2) to do what is right for
their organization or project (Klein et al., 2001). Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 1b: Higher levels of PM’s commitment toward an IS project will lead to more successful IS
project outcomes.
Willingness to Act

Employees that are identified with organizational goals or projects show a greater willingness to act and contribute
meaningfully to the organization or project, thus performing better on the job (Moorman et al., 1998). Organizations
develop and maintain employees’ attachment to a project and goals by rewarding them via incentive contracts
(Moorman et al., 1998). We therefore propose that:
Proposition 2a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to a higher level of PM’s willingness to act toward the
activities related to an IS project.
Given the critical role in managing IS projects, PMs are expected to act positively on activities that affect the
success or failure of an IS project. We therefore propose that:
Proposition 2b: Higher levels of PM’s willingness to act on activities that affect the success or failure of
an IS project will lead to more successful IS project outcomes.
Motivation

Rasch and Tosi (1992) found motivation was an important factor in predicting software project staff performance.
Motivated employees are expected to perform better in their jobs, hence we include motivation as a factor that will
have a positive effect on project outcomes.
Organizations focus on creating favorable conditions that foster and maintain employees’ motivation by offering
incentive contracts (Frey and Osterloh, 2002). In turn, motivated employees put in a greater effort to produce more
valuable results, such as increased work performance (Thomas, 2000). We therefore propose that:
Proposition 3a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of PM’s motivation toward an IS
project.
AT suggests that offering incentives to PMs will induce greater effort and performance on their side, and their
interests will become congruent to those of the owners of the IS project (Frey and Osterloh, 2002). Specifically, we
suggest that when incentives are awarded with the goal of delivering the system on time, within budget, and
satisfying user’s demands, the PMs are expected to display higher motivation toward IS project tasks. We therefore
propose that:
Proposition 3b: Higher level of PM’s motivation will lead to more successful IS project outcomes.
Participation

Cotton (1993) found having employees participate in work-related activities may result in improved productivity
and job performance. Hartwick and Barki (1994) view participation as the behavior, assignments, and activities that
users or their representatives perform during the IS projects. Given the importance of participation in influencing an
employee’s behavior and work performance, we include participation in our study.
Cotton (1993) found that organizations attempt to increase employees’ participation by introducing reward systems.
Specifically rewards increase the level of participation and lead to improved task effectiveness and performance
(Cotton, 1993). Given the critical role of PMs in managing IS projects, it is expected that by providing incentives to
PMs, the PMs will increase their participation in monitoring and controlling the IS projects. We therefore propose
that:
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Proposition 4a: Higher levels of incentives will lead to higher level of project manager’s participation
throughout the IS project activities.
An individual will be motivated to perform an action if the probability of success of action (their expectation
associated with the task) is expected to be high (Griffin, 1999). Invoking AT by setting up an incentive contract, the
owner expects the delivery of a successful IS project. Thus when PMs perceive a high probability for a successful IS
project, they will display a higher participation throughout the project activities; hence they are more likely to
manage and lead an IS project to successful outcomes. We therefore propose that:
Proposition 4b: Higher levels of project manager’s participation throughout IS project activities will lead
to more successful IS project outcomes.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Because we are concerned with PM’s behavior, several alternative methods for testing the research model were
considered, e.g., survey, in-depth interviews, project data analysis, etc. We chose a survey instrument because it
allows for a rich assessment of the constructs and examines the statistical testing of direct relationships in a research
model (Grover et al., 2002). We employed a web-based survey using items from previously validated instruments in
the IS and organizational behavior fields.
Construct and Survey Instrument Development

Constructs from the literature were utilized where possible. We conducted a pilot test of the instrument for clarity,
consistency, and validity with selected users from the IS field, as well as academics and experts in the IS research
areas (Dinev and Hu, 2007). We identified minor issues that resulted in small changes to the final instrument.
The Incentive construct borrowed items from constructs used in the Lambert and Larcker (1993) compensation
measurement instrument. We measured incentives using participants’ involvement with incentive contracts, from no
incentives to a high level of incentives. The remaining variables were captured by multiple items. The Participation
construct was derived and measured using the Barki and Hartwick (1994a) instrument. The Commitment construct
was measured by adapting research items from the instrument developed by Mowday et al. (1979). The Motivation
and Willingness to act constructs were measured by adapting items from previously validated measurement
instruments used in other fields (Hellman et al., 2006). The Information Systems Success construct was measured
using items developed from Banker and Kemerer (1992). The survey items were captured using a 7-point Likert
scale and are presented in Table 4.
Sample Profile and Descriptive Statistics

We targeted a cross-section of IS practitioners belonging to a national IS professionals society. We selected one of
the society’s state branches to limit the target population size to around 500 IS professionals. The exploratory stage
of the study targeted mainly IS project managers. The demographic profile of our respondents is presented in Table
1.
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Type
Position

Industry

Experience with IS
Projects

IS Projects Managed

Incentive Types

Involvement in IncentiveBased Projects

Category
Project Manager
Other
Project Leader
IT Manager Programmer
Systems Manager
Government Agencies
IS/IT Consulting
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities
Education
Finance, banking, and Insurance
Mining
Wholesale and Retail
Other
Manufacturing and Processing
<6 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
>21 years
<6 projects
6-10 projects
11-15 projects
16-20 projects
21-25 projects
> 26 projects
None
Financial
Non-financial
Both
None
1-5 projects
6-10 projects
11-25projects
>25 projects

Distribution (%)
41.7
23.3
15.5
11.7
7.8
21.4
19.4
14.6
9.7
8.7
8.7
7.8
3.9
1.9
35.9
32.0
14.6
8.7
8.7
55.3
15.5
9.7
1.7
1.9
5.8
39.8
39.8
11.7
8.7
44.7
41.8
8.7
3.9
9.7

Table 1. Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents

A total of 117 responses were collected for a response rate of approximately 20%, comparable with other similar
surveys (Sohal and Ng, 1998). Fourteen surveys were disqualified for lack of completeness, leaving 103 usable for
data analysis. As we had more than 100 responses, SEM is a reliable and appropriate technique to test our model
(Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982).
The demographic data were reviewed for the response bias of the population. Descriptive statistics indicate that the
sample does not suffer from a non-response bias (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 2 details respondents’ involvement in and perceptions of successful IS project outcomes. Note that all
incentive-based projects were considered successful, while 80 percent of them were considered delivered on time,
within budget, and adhering to specifications. We believe this is a first indicator that incentive-based projects are
more efficiently and effectively managed and completed.
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Type*
None
(%)
Incentive-based IS projects finished within
budget
Incentive-based IS projects finished on time
Incentive-based IS projects delivered to
specifications
Incentive-based IS projects considered
successful
* Based on 57 incentive-based projects

Number of Projects
6-10 projects
1-5 projects (%)
(%)

>10 projects
(%)

8.8
3.5

78.9
78.9

8.8
15.8

3.5
1.8

1.7

82.4

10.6

5.3

0

84.2

10.5

5.3

Table 2: Respondents’ Involvement in Incentive-Based Projects
Results and Analyses

We used LISREL, a Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique (Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982) in two stages to:
1) assess the reliability and validity of the measurement model using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and 2)
assess the structural relationships of our model using Path Analysis. Our initial results indicated the need for a
further stage in our analysis, that is, to re-specify and develop a second order CFA model (Fornell and Larcker,
1981).
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and actual range of the items used in this study. We checked the sample for
existence of outliers and multicollinearity. No extreme cases were identified and a certain degree of multicollinearity
is required in factor analysis, hence data did not display any anomalies (Hair et al., 1998).
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Construct

Survey Item

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

COMM1

4.30

1.35

-0.10

0.42

COMM2

4.55

1.27

-0.24

0.62

Commitment

Incentive
Motivation

Participation

IS Success

Willingness to
Act

COMM3

4.82

1.43

-0.39

0.41

INCENT

2.43

1.90

1.04

-0.10

MOT1

4.77

1.31

-0.66

1.34

MOT2

4.67

1.38

-0.63

0.64

MOT3

4.88

1.57

-0.69

0.26

MOT4

4.63

1.48

-0.10

0.42

PART1

4.14

1.39

-0.38

0.87

PART2

4.09

1.25

-0.60

1.06

PART3

4.77

1.50

-0.62

0.21

PART4

4.55

1.34

-0.45

0.89

PART5

4.57

1.31

-0.65

1.09

SUC1

3.99

1.28

-0.61

0.61

SUC2

3.74

1.28

0.10

0.52

SUC3

4.27

1.11

-0.73

1.75

WILL1

4.67

1.16

-0.13

1.45

WILL2

4.56

1.07

-0.17

1.99

WILL3

4.65

1.27

-0.64

1.40

WILL4

4.87

1.43

-0.57

0.64

WILL5

4.69

1.28

-0.64

1.33

Cronbach’s α

0.61

1

0.84

0.90

0.91

0.85

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items

Due to the SEM sensitivity to sample size and departures from normality chi-square per degrees of freedom (χ2/d.f.)
is a more appropriate measure of a model fit. Chin (1998) recommends a ratio of χ2/d.f. below 3:1. SEM provides
three additional measures of model fit (GFI, AGFI, and Standardized RMR). The thresholds for a good overall
model fit in IS research are above 0.90 for GFI, above 0.80 for AGFI, and below 0.05 for Standardized RMR (Chin,
1998).
Measurement Model Validation

We conducted a CFA of the original model comprising of 5 factors and 21 items (see Table 3). The original
measurement model results showed a poor goodness of fit based on the above-mentioned threshold values for IS
field (GFI = 0.635 and AGFI = 0.535).
Consistent with SEM techniques, we re-specified and re-estimated the model after we inspected carefully the
modification indices and the residuals (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). As a result, six items were discarded from
further analysis, resulting in a revised model with 5 factors and 15 items (see Table 3).
The statistical results are detailed in the following sections, including all the required validity checks. The revised
model and its items are presented in Table 4 showing the 5-factor solution. We start by addressing the validity
checks in Table 4 and then briefly discuss the model goodness of fit.
The content validity of the new model needed to be established. The fact that all t-tests were statistically significant
showed that all indicator variables provided good measures to their respective construct. With a GFI of 0.90 or
above, all constructs are deemed unidimensional, hence they are reliable and valid (Sörbom and Jöreskog, 1982).
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Further, all scales have a NFI of 0.90 or above, hence they have strong convergent validity and the model fits the
underlying data well.
To test the discriminant validity, CFA was performed on a selected pair of scales, allowing for correlation between
the two constructs. Checks on every pair of the five scales were performed, some of these tests showed chi-square
differences statistically significant at p≤0.01. This result displays unsatisfactory separation of the 3 major constructs.
We observed high correlations (see Table 4) between three of the factors in the model; that is, between Motivation,
Willingness, and Commitment.
Motivation

Willingness to Act

Motivation

1.000

Willingness to Act

0.969

1.000

Commitment

0.919

0.912

Commitment

1.000

Table 5: First Order Factors Correlations

The existence of high correlations between the factors suggests they measure the same higher-level structure or
thing. Hence we introduced a higher-order factor (also known as second-order) model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
We suggest that a second order factor consisting of Motivation, Willingness, and Commitment may exist. Due to
space limitation below we only discuss the second order factor model.
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Item Label

Survey Item Measured on 7-point Likert Scale

Suc1

Was/would the total cost of the project be more or less than the initial estimate?

Suc2

Was/would the actual duration of the project be more or less than the initial estimate?

Factor
Loading
0.94

t-value

0.82

9.926

Composite
Reliability

11.73
0.88

Suc3
Motivation
Willingness to
Act

Commitment
Participation

Incentive

Overall, was/would the final version of the project be completed with more or less than initial
user specifications?

0.750

8.573

Mot1

I felt/would feel more enthusiastic to work on the project.

0.91

11.605

Mot2

I spent/would spend more time thinking about the project while not at work.

0.78

9.16

Will1

Did/would you lead the team more or less successfully towards project's objectives?

0.84

10.203

Will2

Did/would you contribute more or less to effective communication with all team-members
during system development/implementation?

0.72

8.223

Will3

Did/would you monitor more or less closely team-members’ performance during system
development/implementation?

0.7

7.948

Will4

Were/would you be willing to put in effort beyond that normally expected during system
development/implementation?

0.8

9.64

Comm1

I felt/would feel more comfort and freedom working on the project.

0.71

7.913

Comm2

The project had/would have more personal meaning for me.

0.87

10.208

Part1

Your responsibility for estimating development costs of the IS project was/would be?

0.8

7.587

Part2

Your responsibility for the success of the IS project was/would be?

0.77

12.65

Part3

Your responsibility for the development of project was/would be?

0.69

9.082

Incentive

Are or have you been involved in an incentive-scheme during the implementation of an IS
project?

Table 4: Survey Items Used in Final Analysis and Construct Composite Reliability
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Second-Order Factor Model

All residuals indicated that the Success 3 item shows very large residuals, potential common variance, and the lowest loading
on its factor. Therefore the Success 3 item was discarded from further analysis, suggesting that it shares common variance
with Success 1 and 2. The Success 3 item, measuring “the degree of initial specifications completeness,” was considered not
an appropriate measure of project success. .
Goodness of
Fit Measures

χ2/d.f.

>0.9

RMSEA
(<0.050.08)

0.887

0.928

0.118

2.42

0.901

0.929

0.112

2.28

RMR

GFI

AGFI

NFI

NNFI

CFI

<0.05

>0.9

>0.8

>0.9

>0.9

Second-Order
Measurement(
CFA) Model

0.062

0.892

0.788

0.892

Structural
(SEM) Model

0.071

0.885

0.802

0.888

IS Threshold
values

<3:1

Table 6: Second Order CFA and SEM Goodness of Fit Indices

We conducted a second-order CFA resulting in a new 3-factor structure (see Figure 2 and Table 6 for factor loadings). As
noted, three of the first-order factors are actually sub-dimensions of a broader and more encompassing construct.

Figure 2: Second Order Factor Structural (SEM) Model (including loadings)

We turned out attention to the literature and found that Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) examined how to understand and predict
behavior. According to the theory of reasoned action (TRA), the immediate determinant of a person’s behavior is the
person’s intention to perform that behavior. The person’s behavioral intentions are in turn said to be determined by the
person’s attitude and intentions concerning the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Intentions are viewed as antecedent of
active behavior, more specifically participation. Further, we found that Aladwani et al. (2000) viewed reward schemes as an
intervention mechanism of some antecedent variables, i.e., intentions.
The three constructs that comprise the new factor seem to represent behavioral intentions, while participation is the actual
active behavior. We can therefore suggest that if PMs display high levels of behavioral intentions, they will display higher
participation in IS project tasks. We labeled the new factor “Drive.”
We viewed “Drive” as an appropriate higher level construct with the overall meaning of “a motivating instinctual need,
intention or desire, or effort determination leading to an affective state (Oxford Dictionary).” We developed the new
construct “Drive” using a summated scales approach (average of item values in the scale) for the three original constructs,
i.e., motivation, willingness, and commitment (Hair et al., 1998).
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We tested the new model and all validity checks were within satisfactory limits. The new structural model produced a better
overall goodness of fit; with all indices close to the recommended IS guidelines, as indicated in Figure 2 and Table 6.
In the new re-specified model all parameters were found significant except the path from Incentive to the new composite
construct Drive and from Drive to Success. P4a was supported, as well as the expected impact of Drive to Participation. The
overall conclusion is that the new underlying construct Drive is neither influenced directly by incentives, nor influencing
directly IS success. However, Drive influences directly Participation. In other words, higher motivation, willingness to act,
and commitment together as behavioral intentions lead to higher participation, which together with influence from Incentives
leads to a higher rate of IS success.
We found that Success 3, the adherence to specifications, shares a high variance with the other two items of Success. We
conclude that “meeting specifications” is somewhat problematic in IS development. We can further suggest that “on time”
and “within budget” criteria for successful IS project outcomes impact on the “degree to which specifications” are met. We
believe that because specifications are often changed during the development and implementation of an IS, measuring such a
construct at one point in time does not reflect the changing nature over the entire period of time. If a project is finished on
time or within budget it might be at the cost of functionality. Consequently we deemed the item inappropriate for inclusion in
the final model.
DISCUSSION

Our model for testing the appropriateness and applicability of AT to the IS field found that participation was clearly
influenced by incentives, as opposed to motivation, willingness to act, and commitment. Therefore we conclude that AT is
applicable in the context of IS project management.
By undertaking a second order factor analysis, we suggest that our new construct “Drive” influences participation and can be
considered or perceived as an antecedent of participation. Specifically, “Drive” is a more complex construct and embodies
“behavioral intentions” as opposed to participation which is the “active” behavior. “Drive” further implies an element of
“thoroughness” that seeks to continue the active behavior until a result is obtained. The implications are that IS managers
must be determined to initially develop their intentions to participate, leading subsequently to their active participation until
the result is obtained (successful IS project outcomes).
The lack of support for P1a may be explained by the type of incentives applied, financial verses non-financial incentives.
Meyer and Allen found commitment was higher among employees who have been promoted, a non-financial incentive
(Meyer and Allen, 1997). Because financial incentives were the most common incentive type in our study, this may explain
the result in our analysis.
We did not find direct support for P2a; hence suggesting that PMs are not keen to dedicate more of their resources toward an
incentive-based IS project. It follows that PMs do not perceive that incentives would impact on their project-related activities
that can lead to successful IS projects.
Surprisingly, we did not find that motivation is directly influenced by incentives. Since our respondents were predominantly
involved in financial incentive schemes, they are therefore not fulfilling the profile of “income maximisers.” Prior literature
found that IS professionals are mainly “achievers,” thus motivated by non-financial incentives rather than financial ones
(Trittmann et al., 2000). This might explain the lack of support for P3a. To solve this dilemma, in the light of our and prior
research, other explanations should be sought in future research projects.
We found that P4b, higher participation leads to higher IS success, is strongly supported as indicated in Figure 2. We believe
this is an important finding, because it partially supports the applicability of the AT in the IS field. AT is therefore supported
for the participation construct. Willingness to act, commitment, and motivation failed to support the applicability of AT
without influencing individually IS success in the context of this research. Our results lead to the conclusion that higher
commitment, higher willingness to act in favor of an IS project did not directly lead to improved IS project success.
However, together as behavioral intentions, they could lead to higher participation, which in turn lead to higher IS project
outcomes. Further research is needed to support or validate the full applicability of AT in IS.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
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There are certain limitations of the study that may also inform a number of potential avenues for future research. In our
research external validity is limited by the relatively small sample size used in this study. Care should be taken with
generalizing to the entire IS managers population as our sample is not fully representative of the PM population. he
instrument should also be further tested and validated because we discarded certain items from analysis.
We would also like to acknowledge that this research did not aim to provide either an optimal incentive package that could
ensure a successful IS project, nor determine what type of incentives should be used to motivate PMs to better perform and
lead to successful IS project outcomes. Because our research was more exploratory in nature, we view the limitations as
appropriate avenues for further research.
CONCLUSIONS

In this study we investigated the relevance and applicability of AT to the IS field. Specifically, we explored: 1) the
relationship between the use of incentives and IS project managers’ behavior; and 2) the relationship between PM’s behavior
and IS project success.
First, our theoretical contribution is the development of a model to apply AT to the IS field. The contribution emanates from
our findings that PMs’ participation in IS projects is positively influenced by an incentive-based project contract. High levels
of participation in IS project-related activities were associated with high levels of IS project success. We also found that
“Drive” played an antecedent role by increasing the level of participation in IS project activities, without being directly
influenced by incentives. Second, by using SEM techniques in our analysis, we supported the view of introducing higher
order constructs that cannot be directly measured and achieve an improvement in the overall fit of the research model.
From a practical perspective, we suggest that organizations should consider increasing PMs’ participation by increasing their
“Drive,” i.e., their motivation, commitment, and willingness to act. AT principles could be applied to better manage projects
in line with management expectations. Psychometric testing could help identify individuals that exhibit strong drive
tendencies and they could be nurtured into a PM training program. Consequently, organizations should be in a better position
to manage their IS projects, by increasing the rate of successful IS project outcomes, thus avoiding additional costs associated
with IS project failures and/or overruns.
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